



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

ing essence, for instance, the Ego appears to itself only when thinking, but the Ego may also not think at all. Its bodily existence, however, it always retains, even in deepest sleep or in swoons. Thus, also, the products of the Ego in the material world retain their existence as long as the matter, which they have modified, remains, and may survive their originator centuries in the material world.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART.

Translated from the second volume of HEGEL'S *ÆSTHETICS*, by Miss S. A. LONGWELL.

CHIVALRY.—I. *Honor*.

The motive of honor was unknown to ancient classic art. In the *Iliad*, the anger of Achilles furnishes the spirit and moving principle upon which the whole broad production is dependent; but what we, in the modern sense, understand by honor, is not involved here. Achilles finds himself really injured only in this, that his actual share of the booty, which is his reward of honor, his recompense, has been taken from him by Agamemnon. This offence pertains to something real, to a gift, to which a distinction had certainly been attached, an acknowledgment of glory and of bravery, and Achilles becomes angry because Agamemnon insults him; and does not render him, in the presence of the Greeks, the honors that are due him. But this offence does not penetrate to the ultimate point of the personality as such, so that Achilles is appeased by the return of the booty and the addition of more gifts and bounties. Agamemnon finally grants this reparation, although, according to our modern ideas, they have injured each other in the grossest way possible. Through insulting words they have only made themselves angry, while the real offence is cancelled in a way just as real and special. Romantic honor, on the contrary, is of quite another type. In it the offence touches not the real essential value, possession, condition, duty, etc.; but the personality as such, the opinion that the individual has of himself, the value that he attributes to himself. This value, in the

present stage, is just as infinite as the subject is in its own view infinite. In honor man has therefore the readiest affirmative consciousness of his infinite subjectivity, independently of its content. Now that which the individual possesses partakes, through honor, of his personality, which has an absolute value in his own eyes, and ought to have the same in the eyes of others. The measure of honor is not in what the subject really is, but in what it imagines itself to be. The tendency of the imagination is to generalize, so that I can place my entire personality in this particular object which pertains to me. "Honor is only an appearance" people are accustomed to say. Certainly this is the case; but it is better suited to the present stand-point to regard it more seriously. It is not only the appearance, the mere external reflection of the absolute personality. The image of that which in itself is infinite, is itself something infinite. Through this infinity even the manifestation of honor becomes the true existence of the subject in his highest reality; and every particular quality, which honor illuminates and makes its own, is, through this illumination, raised already to an infinite value.

Honor, thus understood, determines a sure foundation in the romantic world, and presupposes that man has emerged just as fully from the merely religious sphere and internal world as he has entered into the living actuality, and that he now brings into this relation only himself in his pure personal independence and absolute availability for existence.

Honor may have the most varied content: for, indeed, all that I am, that I do, that is done to me by others, pertains to my honor. I can, therefore, attribute to honor the merely substantial even, loyalty to princes, devotion to native land, vocation, accomplishment of paternal duties, matrimonial faith, uprightness in business, conscientiousness in scientific investigations, etc. But, in the point of view of honor, all these, in themselves valid and legitimate duties, are not yet sanctioned and recognized as such through themselves, but only as I identify them with my personality and allow it to become an affair of honor. Therefore the man of honor thinks of himself first, in all things; and the question is not whether anything in and of itself is right, but whether it is fitting for him, whether it becomes his honor to engage his faith

that he will be obliged to keep. Thus he may even commit the most reprehensible actions, and yet be a man of honor. He creates arbitrary purposes, presents himself in a certain character and causes himself to be bound, by himself and others, to this, in which no necessity or obligation has place. Then the imagination scatters difficulties and chimerical embarrassments in the way, because it is an affair of honor to maintain the once assumed character. So Diana considers it as opposed to her honor to confess the love which she feels, because she had once been thought to deny an audience to Love.

In general, honor gives value to contingency, since it avails only through the subject, and not through its own inherent reality. We see, therefore, in the romantic representation, on one side, that which is authorized in-and-for-itself as the expressed law of honor, while the individual at the same time unites with the consciousness of right the unlimited self-consciousness of his personality. Honor demands or prohibits something, then compels the whole subjectivity to establish itself in the significance of this demand or prohibition, so that an offence may not be overlooked, pardoned, or made good through any transaction; and no compensation is admissible. But, conversely, honor can become something quite formal and artificial, in so far as it includes nothing except the mere ego, which is for itself infinite, or perhaps accepts an entirely wrong conception as obligatory. In this state honor remains, especially in dramatic representation, a cold and dead subject throughout; while its aims, instead of a real meaning, express but an abstract subjectivity. In the succession of events, only the essential ideas of right offer to the mind a regular connection and necessary development. This lack of deep meaning is clearly manifest when the subtlety of reflection, in itself contingent and trifling, that stands in contact with the subject, shows itself within the compass of honor. The subject is never exhausted, for a minute analysis discovers a crowd of distinctions, particularities which taken in themselves are insignificant, that may yet become important and furnish material for an affair of honor.

The Spaniards have especially built upon this casuistry of reflection concerning points of honor, in their dramatic poets,

and represent their heroes as reasoning upon this subject. So, for example, the fidelity of the wife, investigated in the most insignificant circumstances possible, and even the mere suspicion of others, indeed the mere possibility of such a suspicion even when the husband knows the suspicion to be false, becomes an affair of honor. This leads to collisions as no satisfaction is to be obtained, because we have nothing substantial before us, and therefore, instead of subduing a necessary opposition, can obtain only a limited painful experience.

Also in the French drama there is often mere honor, wholly abstract in itself, which is to avail as the chief interest. But in this regard, the Alarcus of Herr Friedrich von Schlegel is still more frigid and insipid. The hero murders his noble wife. Why? For the sake of honor; and this honor lies in his desire to marry the king's daughter, for whom he cherishes no affection, in order to become the king's son-in-law. This is a despicable pathos and a base conception, which displays itself as something noble and infinite.

Now since honor dwells not only in myself as a manifestation of my personality, but also in the conception and recognition of others, who must again on their side demand the same recognition of their honor, it is therefore essentially susceptible. For how far, and in reference to what I shall extend the demand, depends entirely upon my choice. The smallest offence can be to me in this respect significant. Man stands within the concrete truth, with many things in manifold relations; and the sphere of that which he will consider his own, and in which he will place his honor, may expand indefinitely; so in the self-dependence of the individual and in his reserved personality, which is also embraced in the principle of honor, there are endless disputes and contentions. Therefore the offence generally depends not upon the sense in which I must feel myself injured; for that which is denied, touches the personality that has created such a sense for itself, and now imagines itself assailed in this ideal infinite point. Consequently, every injury to reputation is regarded as something in itself infinite, and can therefore be made good only in an infinite way. There exist, it is true, many grades of offence and just as many grades of satisfaction.

But what the person usually regards in this sphere as an offence, the measure of this offence, and the reparation, depend wholly upon the subjective free will, which has the right to advance even to the most scrupulous reflections and most irritable sensitiveness. When such a satisfaction is demanded, the offender as well as the person injured must be recognized as a man of honor. For what I wish is the recognition of my honor by my equal. But in order to have honor for and through him, I must esteem him as a man of honor, infinite in his personality, the injury that he did me and my subjective enmity toward him notwithstanding. So the principle of honor has in general this determining foundation, that no one through his own actions can give to another a right over himself; and therefore, whatever he may have done and committed, he is considered, after as before, a being of infinite nature, invariably the same, and will be regarded and treated as such.

Since honor depends, in its controversies and reparations, in this regard, upon the personal independence which knows itself circumscribed by nothing, but manifests itself clearly, we see that again appear which determined in the heroic manifestation of the ideal a sure foundation, namely, this same independence. In honor, we have not only the energy of will and its spontaneity, but personal independence is here bound with the conception of itself, and this conception expresses precisely the only purport of honor; so that it manifests its personality and its whole subjectivity in the external and existing. Honor is consequently its own reflected self-dependence, which has only this reflection for its being; and it is left plainly contingent whether its significance is the customary and necessary, or the accidental and insignificant.